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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
JULIE M. CANNELL

ON BEHALF OF

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 2004-178-E

Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS
AFFILIATION.

A. My name is Julie M. Cannell. I am president of J.M. Cannell, Inc., which provides advisory services to electric utility companies and other types of firms and organizations with an interest in the industry. Prior to establishing my firm in February 1997, I was employed by the New York-based investment manager, Lord Abbett & Company, from June 1978 to January 31, 1997, as well as the summer of 1977. During my tenure with Lord Abbett, I was a securities analyst specializing in the electric utility and telecommunications services industries; portfolio manager of America's Utility Fund, an equity utility mutual fund; portfolio manager of numerous institutional equity portfolios, and co-director of Lord Abbett's Equity Research Department. Further information on my background and experience can be found in Appendix A.

1 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EXPERIENCE THAT**
2 **ALLOWS YOU TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE**
3 **VIEWPOINT OF INVESTORS.**

4 A. As a securities analyst, I specialized in the electric utility industry
5 and the individual companies comprising it. As a portfolio manager,
6 I applied that knowledge, along with investment fundamentals,
7 toward investment decisions on behalf of institutions and individual
8 investors. And, as an advisor to the industry, a great deal of my
9 work has dealt with investors and their perceptions.

10 **Q. AS AN ANALYST OR PORTFOLIO MANAGER, DID YOU**
11 **FOLLOW SCE&G?**

12 A. Yes, I did. Both Lord Abbett and America's Utility Fund
13 maintained a holding in the common stock of the Company, and
14 after the formation of a holding company, the common stock of its
15 parent, SCANA Corporation. Additionally, I spent several years as
16 portfolio manager of the SCE&G pension assets that were managed
17 by Lord Abbett.

18 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE KEY POINTS OF YOUR**
19 **TESTIMONY.**

20 A. There are three parts to my testimony.

21 **Investors' Perceptions Related to the Present Proceeding**

22 -- This section reviews the investment community's perceptions of

1 SCE&G and its parent company SCANA, with specific emphasis on
2 how investors view the present rate proceeding and what it means
3 for the Company. This review is based on a number of recent
4 publications by rating agencies and investment analysts discussing
5 their perceptions of the current regulatory situation of the Company.

6 **How Investors Evaluate Investments in Utility Companies**

7 -- This section discusses why investors choose to invest in electric
8 utilities, with particular emphasis on why the regulatory climate in
9 which the utility operates is of such importance to investors. This
10 section of the testimony also discusses why the risk of investing in
11 the electric utility industry has risen substantially in recent years on
12 an industry-wide basis and why markets today react so swiftly and
13 strongly to unfavorable news about a company.

14 **Return on Equity for SCE&G** --This section discusses an
15 appropriate ROE for SCE&G from an investor's perspective. In
16 addition to reviewing the testimony submitted by Dr. Burton
17 Malkiel, I will put his recommendation in the context of how the
18 investment community is viewing this regulatory proceeding and the
19 Company's requested ROE. My conclusion is that the Company's
20 proposed ROE of 11.75% is within a range of returns that investors
21 would consider reasonable and constructive.

22

1 **INVESTORS' PERCEPTIONS OF THIS PROCEEDING**

2

3 **Q. HOW HAVE YOU GAUGED INVESTORS' PERCEPTIONS**
4 **OF THIS PROCEEDING?**

5 A. To supplement my own knowledge of the industry, I have reviewed
6 various reports of the credit rating agencies and investment analysts
7 related to SCE&G and SCANA. A clear picture of investors'
8 perceptions emerges from these reports, which is very much in
9 keeping with my own perceptions.

10 **Q. HOW DO THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES VIEW SCE&G,**
11 **AND THE SOUTH CAROLINA REGULATORY**
12 **ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH IT OPERATES?**

13 A. A recent written report on the company came from Moody's
14 Investors Service, which rates the Company A1, with a stable
15 outlook. As the report states, much of the reason for the A1 rating
16 and stable outlook is the perceived quality of regulation in South
17 Carolina.

18

19 **"Rating Rationale**

20

21 South Carolina Electric & Gas' ("SCE&G" A1 senior
22 secured) ratings are supported by the constructive regulatory
23 relationship the company enjoys with both commissioner's
24 [sic] and staff, a growing service territory with attractive
25 customer demographics, and relatively low cost rates. ...

1
2 ... Essentially the [2002] rate case resolution was viewed
3 positively, as it demonstrated the PSC's long-term planning
4 views and pro-active approach to utility relations and
5 financial health. This is exactly the reason why Moody's is
6 now cautious regarding SCE&G's ability to seek additional
7 rate relief in the near to intermediate term.
8

9 Financially, the utility is performing well, and we are
10 favorably disposed to rate regulated utility operations in
11 State's [sic] that are not in the middle of introducing
12 competitive or other deregulation initiatives.
13

14 **Rating Outlook**

15
16 Our stable outlook is a function of the inherent stability of the
17 rate regulated operations, and the constructive and supportive
18 relationship the company enjoys with the State Public Service
19 Commission.
20

21 **What Could Change the Rating – UP**

22
23 A steady improvement in credit metrics, both leverage and
24 cash flow coverage would be viewed favorably. The timely
25 completion of the remaining construction program for both
26 the jasper[sic] and Lake Murray dam remediation projects,
27 and clarity as to the ability to seek additional rate relief, post
28 completion of the projects, would also be viewed positively.
29

30 **What Could Change the Rating – DOWN**

31
32 A degradation to the Company's forecasted credit metrics,
33 either as a result of operational cost pressures, or unexpected
34 delays in completing the construction program. The prospect
35 for additional rate relief is a primary driver of our financial
36 expectations. We also note that the utility's capital
37 expenditures are expected to rise again in 2006, as disclosed
38 in the recently filed Form 10-K.
39

40 **Recent Developments**

41
42 On February 10, South Carolina passed legislation that
43 modified the framework of the state's Public Service

1 commission, which included a commission nominating
2 committee, several new members to the commission and an
3 Office of Regulatory Staff to represent the public interest.
4 These changes introduce uncertainty as to the commission's
5 overall culture, and potential working relationships with the
6 utilities they regulate.

7 --March 30, 2004 report: "Credit Opinion: South Carolina
8 Electric & Gas Company
9

10
11 Standard and Poor's also offered a similar opinion last year:

12
13 Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it
14 affirmed its 'A-' long-term corporate credit ratings on
15 SCANA Corp. and its affiliates, South Carolina Electric &
16 Gas Co., (SCE&G) and Public Service Co. of North Carolina
17 Inc. (PSNC). The outlook for all the entities is stable.

18 -----

19 Standard & Poor's also said that the ratings on SCANA, on a
20 consolidated basis, reflect the parent company's current high
21 leverage offset by stable cash flow from regulated electric and
22 gas businesses, constructive regulatory environments, and
23 competitive business positions."
24

25 "June 6, 2003 report: "SCANA and Units Long-Term
26 Ratings Affirmed; Short-Term Ratings Lowered to 'A-
27 2.'"
28

29 Both of these reports indicate that credit rating agencies see SCE&G
30 and SCANA as financially stable and hence good credit risks. Both
31 note the stable and constructive nature of regulation in South
32 Carolina. The more recent report from Moody's clearly recognizes
33 "that the prospect of additional rate relief is a primary driver" in
34 Moody's financial expectations supporting the A1 rating. The
35 Moody's report also shows that because of the recent changes in the
36 structure and membership of the Commission, the investment

1 community is watching to see if there will be a change in the future
2 course of regulation in South Carolina.

3 **Q. HAVE ANY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS RECENTLY**
4 **EXPRESSED OPINIONS REGARDING SCE&G AND**
5 **SCANA'S PRESENT REGULATORY SITUATION?**

6 A. Yes, they have. UBS Warburg wrote:

7 "Though management does not appear concerned about the
8 recent passage of South Carolina legislation reforming the
9 regulatory processes in the state and the replacement of four
10 out of the state's seven commissioners, we believe these
11 changes could yield a less constructive regulatory
12 environment over time—a key variable we will be
13 monitoring.

14
15 Moreover, though we are not expecting a draconian outcome
16 and SCE&G is under-earning its 12.45% allowed ROE (and
17 should continue to do so as its current rate base does not yet
18 encompass the full cost of the Jasper plant and its future
19 operating costs), we still view the reality of the segment
20 entering the rate arena via a full-blown mid-2004 rate case as
21 an underlying risk—especially given the aforementioned
22 regulatory reforms."

23 April 26, 2004 report: "SCANA Corp.:
24 Comprehensive 1Q Review: Edging Up Assumptions."

25
26

27 Regulatory Research offered an opinion, as well:

28

29 "Given the constructive regulatory climate, we would expect
30 a reasonable outcome in a plant recovery rate proceeding;
31 however, it is not clear if one will be filed in the near term.
32 As issues are resolved and the lower risk profile of the
33 consolidated entity is realized, we expect the shares to trade at
34 a premium. In the meantime, SCG's 4.1% dividend yield is
35 just slightly below the industry average. Accordingly, we are
36 changing our recommendation on the SCG shares to "Buy"
37 from "Hold."

1 April 2, 2004 report: "SCANA Corp."

2
3
4 Further commentary was offered by Shields & Company:

5
6 "Management's goal is to increase earnings by 4% to 6%
7 annually through 2006, a goal that's achievable but requires
8 support of the South Carolina Public Service Commission
9 (SCPSC). Our forecast incorporates an \$85 million (6%) rate
10 increase effective the first quarter of 2005 and a \$275 million
11 (7.5 million shares) common stock sale mid-2005.

12
13 *Earnings Hinge on Outcome of Yet to be Announced*
14 *Rate Request at SCE&G*

15
16 The company's last rate increase in South Carolina was
17 effective February 2003 and totaled \$70.7 million (5.8%).
18 The decision provided for 12.45% return on common equity
19 and included construction work in progress attributable to
20 Jasper (about 60% of estimated completion costs) in rate
21 base. The expected rate filing will primarily reflect non-rate
22 base Jasper investment and its related operating expenses.
23 Since the Jasper investment was reviewed extensively in the
24 prior case, controversy should be minimal. We estimate a
25 filing sometime this summer totaling \$120 million. The
26 commission is required to reach a decision within six months
27 of application so new rates should be in effect for most of
28 2005. Our forecast incorporates an 11.7% return on common
29 and relief totaling \$80 million effective April 1, 2005.

30 April 7, 2004 report: "SCANA Corporation."

31
32 And A.G. Edwards and Sons also weighed in:

33
34 Roughly \$276 million of the Jasper Plant expenditures were
35 included in the early 2003 rate decision, but additional rate
36 relief is necessary to recognize the full cost of the plant. The
37 upcoming rate decision will be a primary determinant of EPS
38 growth in 2005 and beyond.

39
40 Following constructive utility legislation in March of 2004,
41 four new members were added to the seven-member Public
42 Service Commission of South Carolina. The change in
43 commission make-up results in some uncertainty as to the

1 future treatment, but, given SCG's historical constructive
2 regulatory relationship and the fact that the PSC has
3 recognized a portion of Jasper, we believe the company will
4 be authorized a constructive rate order. In addition, we
5 believe SCG's intention to use deferred synthetic coal tax
6 credits to negate the need for rate relief related to the Lake
7 Murray dam reinforcement project will be well-received by
8 the commission."

9 April 3, 2004 report: "SCANA Reports Results Well
10 Ahead of Expectations."
11
12

13 Wachovia Securities also addressed the rate case:
14

15 "SCANA's utility subsidiaries serve a growing area with
16 competitively priced rates. A historically constructive
17 regulatory climate supports our assumption that investments
18 in new plant will translate into future earnings. The balance
19 sheet has been strengthened with new equity and should
20 continue to improve. Earnings and dividend growth,
21 combined with an attractive current yield, provide an above-
22 average total return potential.
23

24 Over the next 12 months, we believe the shares of SCG
25 warrant a valuation range of about \$34-40, based on our
26 blended EPS estimates for 2004-05, our estimated 3-5 year
27 EPS growth rate, and a normal P/E multiple of 12-14x. Risks
28 to achieving our expected valuation range may include the
29 company's ability to manage the risks of its gas marketing
30 business in Georgia, changing credit rating agency standards,
31 unplanned nuclear plant outages, and maintaining its
32 relationships with its various regulatory agencies."

33 --May 28, 2004 report: "Upgrading: CEG, CIN, ETR,
34 FPL, NI, PGN, SCG, SO. Impact of Rising Rates on
35 Current Valuation May be Overdone."
36

37 **Q. WHAT THEMES DO YOU SEE EXPRESSED IN THESE**
38 **REPORTS?**

39 A. The opinions offered by these analysts affirm that investors perceive
40 the regulatory climate in South Carolina to be constructive and that

1 this viewpoint is important to the continued attractiveness of
2 investment in SCE&G and SCANA. These statements also indicate
3 --the Warburg statement most especially-- that the investment
4 community expects the constructive regulatory climate to continue
5 and that events are being watched closely to determine if that will
6 prove correct.

7 **Q. DO THE FAVORABLE COMMENTS ABOUT REGULATION**
8 **IN SOUTH CAROLINA INDICATE THAT INVESTORS**
9 **PERCEIVE REGULATION IN THE STATE TO BE BIASED**
10 **TOWARD INVESTORS?**

11 A. Not at all. Investors see regulation in South Carolina as balanced
12 and constructive. By this I mean that regulation has historically
13 balanced the interests of investors and consumers in an even-handed
14 and constructive way --one which I believe benefits all parties.

15 This conclusion is demonstrated by a recent report by
16 Lehman Brothers that provided a ranking of state utility
17 commissions from an investor perspective. Tier 1 was "Most
18 Shareholder Oriented" and Tier 5 was "Most Consumer Oriented."
19 Lehman Brothers ranked South Carolina in "Tier 3" on this scale --
20 exactly in the middle.¹ This ranking indicates that investors see

¹Lehman Brothers March 5, 2004 report: "They're Back! Twenty-Six Rate Cases This Year Give Rise to the Regulators."

1 regulation in South Carolina as fairly balancing the interests of
2 consumers and investors in a way that maximizes the interest of
3 both.

4 **Q. IS IT POSSIBLE FOR A COMMISSION TO BE SEEN AS**
5 **BEING FAIR TO BOTH CONSUMERS AND INVESTORS?**

6 A. Yes. As discussed in more detail below, what investors value most
7 in utilities is stable earnings and regular dividends supported by
8 consistent and fair regulation. Where regulation is seen as providing
9 such stability, investors are comfortable making capital available to
10 utilities on reasonable terms. Reasonably priced capital greatly
11 benefits the utility's customers in the form of reduced capital costs.
12 Fairness to investors and fairness to customers are not mutually
13 exclusive but actually go hand in hand.

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WHY INVESTORS CHOOSE TO INVEST IN ELECTRIC UTILITIES

Q. WHAT GOALS LEAD INVESTORS TO INVEST IN ELECTIC UTILITIES?

A. Historically, electric utilities have been regarded as investment vehicles that provide stable performance through the ups and downs of market cycles and changing economic conditions. Electric utilities have typically earned a reasonable return even when conditions were not favorable for other companies. Accordingly, electric utility stocks have been particularly valuable holdings when conditions were not favorable to investments in more volatile industry sectors. In other words, investors might see greater returns from investment in other industries when times were good, but they would lose less on electric utility stocks when times were not good.

In addition, the reliability of electric utilities' earnings streams permitted most of the companies to continue to pay regular dividends during both good and bad economic cycles. For investors with a need for regular cash income, the prospect of regular dividends has been an important consideration in making a decision to invest in electric utility stocks.

1 Based on these factors, investors have traditionally viewed
2 electric utility stocks as bond substitutes. In other words, electric
3 utility stocks have provided regular cash returns in the form of
4 dividends and the shares themselves were seen to have a stable
5 underlying value. Electric utilities historically have paid out a large
6 proportion of their earnings as dividends, and their large
7 construction programs have kept them dependent on the capital
8 markets. As a result, electric utility stocks as a group have tended to
9 move closely in line with the direction of interest rates, but in an
10 inverse relationship. That is, utility stock prices rose when interest
11 rates fell, and vice versa. These factors made electric utilities a
12 preferred investment during economic slowdowns or recessions and
13 owning them was a way of balancing the risks in a portfolio of
14 stocks that included stocks in more volatile industries.

15 **Q. HAVE THE RECENT CHANGES IN THE INDUSTRY**
16 **INCREASED THE RISK OF INVESTING IN ELECTRIC**
17 **UTILITIES?**

18 A. Yes. Investors now understand that the predictability of the electric
19 utility industry's earnings, across the sector, has been undermined by
20 the restructuring that has taken place in many parts of the country.
21 These risks are in addition to the risks posed by technological,
22 economic, environmental and other policy changes that affect the

1 industry. These increased risks means that investors no longer
2 perceive electric utilities as a group as being as much the “safe
3 havens” they once were.

4 Investors’ goals, however, have not fundamentally changed.
5 They still look to electric utilities primarily as defensive
6 investments, and still look for stable performance and regular
7 dividends as the reason to invest in electric utilities. But investors
8 also understand that the investment risk in electric stocks has risen
9 significantly, and that there is more risk than before that investors’
10 goals in investing in this sector may be frustrated.

11 In the end, investors have a very large universe of stocks from
12 which to select; with few exceptions, they have no requirement to
13 own electric utility stocks. Consequently, investors now require a
14 higher return for investing in the electric utility industry to balance
15 the increased risk associated with it.

16 **Q. GIVEN SOUTH CAROLINA’S CAREFUL AND**
17 **CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO REGULATORY**
18 **CHANGE, HOW DO THESE CONCERNS AFFECT SCE&G?**

19 A. Markets tend to make judgments about investment risks that apply to
20 industry sectors as a whole. Company specific risk factors are
21 additive to sector risk. In other words, investors first determine the

1 risk involved in investing in a particular sector. They then add to
2 that sector risk the specific risks applicable to individual companies.

3 **Q. IN YOUR EXPERIENCE AS AN ANALYST AND**
4 **PORTFOLIO MANAGER, COULD A PERCEIVED CHANGE**
5 **IN A COMPANY’S REGULATORY CLIMATE AFFECT**
6 **YOUR INVESTMENT OPINION?**

7 A. Absolutely. During my tenure as an active investor, the quality of a
8 company’s regulatory environment was a critical factor in my
9 assessment of its investment attractiveness. An adverse regulatory
10 decision could be a key determinant in my recommendation or
11 decision to sell a stock already owned or not make an investment in
12 one under consideration.

13 **Q. WHY IS THE PERCEPTION OF REGULATORY CLIMATE**
14 **OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO INVESTORS?**

15 A. Equity investors today are still seeking companies that can offer
16 stability in earnings and dividends. Fixed income investors look for
17 stable and adequate cash flows to ensure payment of principal and
18 interest when due, as indicated by stable credit ratings. The ability
19 to pay dividends and sustain credit ratings is directly related to the
20 consistency and sufficiency of a utility’s earnings, which depend in
21 large part on how the utility is regulated. If there is uncertainty
22 about whether regulation will allow a utility the opportunity to earn a

1 reasonable return in future years, then that uncertainly will lead
2 investors to avoid holding investment positions in the utility, all
3 other things being equal.

4 As a result, I believe that investors selecting electric utility
5 stocks today place a very high value on consistent and constructive
6 regulation. And with a new round of base rate case filings underway
7 in the industry, I think it likely that the quality of regulation will
8 receive renewed investor attention.

9 **Q. HOW HAS THE INVESTMENT INDUSTRY ITSELF**
10 **CHANGED IN RECENT YEARS?**

11 A. In recent years, institutional investors and hedge funds have grown
12 dramatically in the amount of capital they control. This growth has
13 had a significant impact on the speed with which the market reacts to
14 unfavorable developments. It has led the market to be much more
15 reactive and much less forgiving than it may have been in the past.

16 **Q. WHY ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS OF SUCH**
17 **IMPORTANCE GENERALLY?**

18 A. Because of the sheer size of their investment positions, institutions
19 can effectively direct the course of individual securities, if not the
20 market as a whole. Institutional investors include financial
21 institutions such as mutual funds, investment companies, insurance
22 companies, commercial and investment banks, and various types of

1 public retirement funds. They approach the investment selection
2 process from the standpoint of a portfolio. An investment portfolio
3 is a collection of stocks selected to achieve the highest possible
4 return within a commensurate level of risk. Therefore, institutional
5 investors only keep electric utilities in their portfolios when such
6 stocks contribute to achieving the desired risk/return relationship.

7 It should be remembered that, generally, the customers of
8 institutional investors are individuals and it is they who ultimately
9 gain or suffer loss from changes in the value of the institution's
10 investments. Anyone who has a stake in a retirement plan, owns a
11 mutual fund, or has a trust fund, for example, is directly or indirectly
12 a client of an institutional investor. But the individuals who make
13 the decisions concerning these investments are paid money
14 managers, and how they see their responsibilities to the clients they
15 serve, and the way that their performance is judged, have a great
16 deal to do with how they react to developments in the market.

17 **Q. WHY ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IMPORTANT TO**
18 **SCE&G AND SCANA?**

19 A. Institutional investors today hold 45% of SCANA's total common
20 shares. Such investors warrant significant attention because they can
21 dramatically change the market for SCANA's shares. Because
22 institutional investors own large blocks of shares relative to the

1 volumes typically traded, their activity in moving in or out of the
2 Company's shares is often noticeable as a significant change in the
3 price and volume of shares being traded for the Company. This
4 change may be picked up by other institutional investors, by the
5 investment community in general, and eventually by individual
6 investors. These other entities will then look to see what is driving
7 this trend in the stock and whether the trend is likely to continue or
8 disappear. If they see support for the trend, they may follow the lead
9 of the firms that initially began to move the market, and by
10 following the leaders, the late movers may further strengthen the
11 trend.

12 **Q. WHY MIGHT AN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR CHOOSE**
13 **NOT TO HOLD INVESTMENTS IN A PARTICULAR**
14 **ELECTRIC UTILITY?**

15 A. Several factors might be drivers. First, institutional investors have
16 fiduciary responsibilities. For example, managers of pension assets
17 fall under Federal ERISA laws, which mandate that a portfolio
18 manager's decisions meet the so-called "prudent man" standard.
19 That is to say, he or she is expected not to make investment
20 decisions that are unduly risky or to retain stocks that are unduly
21 risky given the investment goals of the portfolio and the function of
22 the stock within it.

1 In addition, institutional investors have performance
2 pressures. It is not enough for stocks in a portfolio simply to
3 increase in value. Rather, relative performance is what counts.
4 Investment performance is gauged against a market proxy (such as
5 the Standard & Poor's 500 Index) or a peer group of investors (i.e.,
6 investors with a similar style, such as value, growth, growth &
7 income, small cap, etc.). Mutual fund rating organizations such as
8 Morningstar track and publicize the relative performance for mutual
9 funds, and various pension consultants perform the same service for
10 their client organizations.

11 **Q. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN AN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR**
12 **UNDERPERFORMS?**

13 A. The results can vary, but eventually, underperformance will result in
14 lost business and personnel changes. Mutual fund shareholders can
15 sell their fund shares. A pension plan sponsor can fire the
16 professional investor or reduce the assets under their investor's
17 management. And, of course, poor performance also disadvantages
18 the individual, who has entrusted his monies to the institution for
19 management.

20 **Q. HOW LONG A PERIOD DOES AN INSTITUTIONAL**
21 **INVESTOR HAVE BEFORE PERFORMANCE BECOMES**
22 **AN ISSUE?**

1 A. Again, it can vary. But there is little argument that institutional
2 investors no longer have the luxury of a long time horizon in which
3 to show performance. Investors want results. And with the public
4 visibility that investment results now have (through organizations
5 such as Morningstar and the various pension consultants) and the
6 resulting performance pressure, most investment organizations are
7 now operating with a much shorter time horizon than in years past.
8 Generally speaking, a long investment time horizon today can be as
9 short as 12-18 months. So, a stock that is unlikely to perform within
10 the prescribed time horizon is usually not attractive for purchase or
11 continued investment by an institutional investor.

12 **Q. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR INVESTMENTS IN**
13 **REGULATED UTILITIES SPECIFICALLY?**

14 A. This shortened time frame means that if there is bad news,
15 institutional investors are more likely to react quickly.

16 **Q. DO ALL INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS FUNCTION**
17 **WITHIN THE TIME FRAMES YOU DESCRIBE?**

18 A. No. There is a type of institutional investor called a hedge fund that
19 frequently buys and sells the same stock during the course of a day.

20 **Q. WHAT IMPACT DO HEDGE FUNDS HAVE ON THE**
21 **MARKET IN GENERAL AND STOCKS IN PARTICULAR?**

1 A. Their impact can be dramatic. Hedge funds are well known for
2 trading in information; their actions are frequently event-driven.
3 Sometimes that information is factual and other times it falls into the
4 category of rumor. Because investors at hedge funds have wide
5 information networks and are in frequent communication with
6 companies and a broad range of other investors, they have the ability
7 and the power to create volatility, which in turn impacts the
8 movement of stock prices. And because the number of hedge funds
9 participating in the market and the funds' assets have grown
10 exponentially in recent years—recent estimates put the numbers at
11 over 5000 firms with assets of \$800 billion globally during the
12 second quarter of 2004, with the top 150 U.S. hedge funds' assets at
13 almost \$500 billion, compared to 610 firms with \$39 billion in assets
14 in 1990—they have become a very strong force both in the market
15 and in stocks in which they are interested. When they like an
16 industry group or a stock, hedge funds can provide substantial
17 support to stock prices. But conversely, when they become
18 disenchanted, their tendency is to sell quickly and without remorse.
19 Although their focus is not on contributing to orderly markets, hedge
20 funds are a formidable presence in the market place and must be
21 reckoned with.

1 **Q. CAN YOU GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF HOW HEDGE FUNDS**
2 **MIGHT TRAFFIC IN SCANA’S STOCK?**

3 A. Yes. Earlier in the year, SCE&G announced its intention to file the
4 current rate case. Hedge funds assuredly made assumptions about
5 the details of the case, including its resolution, prior to the filing. If,
6 when the Commission’s decision is ultimately announced, the details
7 fall short of those expectations, the hedge funds could put significant
8 pressure on the stock either through outright sales, or short-selling,
9 i.e. selling stock that is borrowed in anticipation that the price of the
10 stock will drop before the borrowed stock must be replaced. Hedge
11 funds seek to get ahead of the broader market and react to news
12 before the market can. Accordingly, if hedge funds decide to make
13 moves on SCANA’s shares based on the order in this proceeding,
14 they will begin to do so within hours of the release of the order.

15 **Q. WHAT ROLE DO CREDIT AGENCIES PLAY IN**
16 **INVESTORS’ EXPECTATIONS?**

17 A. In the wake of financial disasters, bankruptcies, and the ensuing
18 severe erosion in investor confidence in the past few years, credit
19 issues have become critically important not only to fixed income
20 investors, but also to equity investors. While credit downgrades
21 initially impacted only the most troubled companies, a spillover
22 effect soon was seen on healthy utilities. Part of this was due to the

1 fact that the rating agencies came under harsh criticism that they had
2 failed to catch problems early enough in companies such as Enron
3 Corp. As a result, they began to heighten their scrutiny of all entities
4 under their watch and became far more proactive in making rating
5 changes. As well, “headline risk” began to come into play, as
6 investors worried that –when credit problems in an industry are in
7 the headlines-- any company in the sector could be vulnerable to a
8 downgrade. Thus, equity investors now closely watch the actions of
9 the credit agencies, because any change in ratings can have a
10 significant impact on a company’s stock price.

11 **Q. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN A CREDIT DOWNGRADE**
12 **OCCURS?**

13 A. In the simplest terms, it becomes more expensive for a company to
14 raise money in the capital markets because a downgrade raises a
15 company’s risk profile and consequently, increases the cost of debt.
16 And because of the increased linkage these days between ratings and
17 stock prices, the price frequently reacts—sometimes quite
18 strongly—to a downgrade. To take an extreme example, Moody’s
19 Investors Service cut the ratings of Allegheny Energy and its
20 subsidiaries to “junk,” or below investment-grade, status on October
21 1, 2002. The prior day, September 30, Allegheny’s stock price
22 closed at \$13.10. By October 8, when the company announced that

1 it was in technical default with creditors due to its inability to meet
2 higher collateral requirements prompted by the downgrade, the stock
3 closed at \$3.80. Thus, in the space of a week, Allegheny's stock
4 price—and the value of a shareholder's investment—lost 71% of its
5 value. Although this is an extreme example, it is nonetheless
6 indicative of why the markets now watch changes in credit ratings so
7 closely.

8
9 **RETURN ON EQUITY FOR SCE&G**

10
11 **Q. HOW DO YOU BELIEVE SCE&G'S REQUESTED RETURN**
12 **ON EQUITY OF 11.75% COMPORTS WITH INVESTORS'**
13 **PERCEPTIONS?**

14 **A.** I believe that the investment community would find an 11.75% ROE
15 reasonable for SCE&G and that it would be seen as a positive signal
16 that the history of constructive regulation is being carried forward in
17 South Carolina. It is consistent with the Shields and Company
18 report which indicated that investors are expecting the Company to
19 be granted an ROE in the range of 11.7%. It represents a reasonable,
20 but not excessive, reduction in the current allowed ROE of 12.45%
21 that was granted two years ago in the Company's last electric rate
22 proceeding.

1 **Q. IN THE CURRENT LOW INTEREST RATE**
2 **ENVIRONMENT, DO YOU CONSIDER INVESTORS’**
3 **EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE COMPANY’S**
4 **PROSPECTIVE ROE AWARD TO BE REASONABLE?**

5 A. Yes, I do. Although interest rates are near historically low levels,
6 that factor is not the only one that investors are taking into account.
7 I believe that, because of the greater risks that the industry is facing,
8 investors are requiring a greater risk premium on their utility
9 investments. Thus, I think that the broader interest rate environment
10 should not be considered in isolation in terms of establishing ROEs
11 for utility companies. And it should be noted that the recent low
12 levels of interest rates appears to have passed, with the Federal
13 Reserve’s decision on June 29 to raise rates for the first time in
14 several years and the Fed’s warning that further increases could be
15 forthcoming with any additional indications of mounting inflation.
16 That alert draws attention to another risk that lies in an anemic ROE
17 award at the current time. If SCE&G is given an ROE materially
18 below the last allowed level of 12.45% at a time of rising interest
19 rates, the Company’s present under-earning position could be
20 compounded. With unnecessarily weak financials, the need to
21 access the capital markets could become greater as the risk of credit

1 downgrades becomes even more pronounced, which in turn would
2 result in a vicious negative cycle.

3 **Q. WOULD YOU PLEASE COMMENT ON DR. BURTON**
4 **MALKIEL'S ROE RECOMMENDATION?**

5 A. Dr. Malkiel notes that the cost of equity capital for the Company is
6 at least 10.5%. He further opines that there are good reasons for the
7 PSC to maintain the existing 12.45% allowed return, namely the
8 unusually low level of interest rates and anticipated rise in those
9 rates, as well as SCE&G's having undertaken major investments
10 during a period when required returns were higher. I agree with that
11 opinion. Dr. Malkiel concludes his recommendation with the
12 suggestion that the Commission assign an ROE range for the
13 Company, so as to accommodate normal changes in economic
14 conditions, territorial growth, weather, and unforeseen conditions.
15 His proposed range of reasonableness for an equity return is 10.5%
16 to 12.45%, with a midpoint of 11.5%. The Company's 11.75%
17 request is well within the range and slightly below the two-thirds
18 point in the range.

19 **Q. WHY DO YOU LOOK AT THE HIGHER SIDE OF DR.**
20 **MALKIEL'S RECOMMENDED RANGE?**

21 A. As noted in the previous discussion on institutional investors'
22 current views of the company, I believe that investors are expecting

1 SCE&G to be granted an ROE of 11.7%, and they want to see a
2 continuation of the state's historically constructive regulatory
3 environment. Investment risk in the electric utility industry is higher
4 than it has been, and investors are requiring greater levels of
5 compensation to assume that added risk. As an input in valuation
6 models, earnings levels logically translate into the attractiveness of a
7 stock, other factors being equal. A reasonable ROE award should
8 sustain the Company's earnings power and affect the potential for
9 future dividend growth. Conversely, a lower ROE could potentially
10 undermine investors' expectations for ongoing dividend growth.
11 These are important reasons why I would support an ROE in the
12 upper half of Dr. Malkiel's range.

13 **Q. COULD AN ROE AWARD THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH**
14 **INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS ALSO BE EXPECTED TO**
15 **PROVIDE BENEFITS TO SCE&G CUSTOMERS?**

16 **A.** Absolutely. A higher ROE permits the realization of a stronger
17 earnings stream. In turn, that can improve a company's stock's
18 valuation prospects, which results in a higher stock price. Thus,
19 when a company needs to tap the equity markets for capital needed
20 to meet customer needs, it can get more for its money. Said another
21 way, each share sold brings more equity into the Company with the
22 same commitment by the Company to generate earnings and pay

1 dividends to support the value of that share. In regard to debt
2 financing, a higher ROE awarded to SCE&G would be viewed as a
3 sign of constructive regulation and would be positive for the
4 Company's credit rating. Importantly, customers' rates will
5 eventually reflect this lower cost of capital.

6 **Q. DOES THIS COMPLETE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

7 A. Yes.

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BUSINESS EXPERIENCE:

1997- J.M. CANNELL, INC.

President of firm providing advisory services specializing in the electric utility industry.

1977 - 1997 LORD ABBETT & COMPANY, New York, New York

1995 - 1997 Equity Portfolio Manager. Responsibility for management and client servicing of ten institutional equity portfolios with total assets in excess of \$700M. Actively and successfully involved in new institutional business marketing effort.

1994-1996 Associate Director of Equity Research. Provided oversight of departmental activities, including supervision of analysts' research efforts and support staff functions.

1992-1995 Portfolio Manager, America's Utility Fund. Full portfolio management responsibility for the fund since its May 1992 inception.

1978-1995 Securities Analyst. Sole responsibility for analysis of and stock recommendations for the electric utility and telecommunications industries. Other areas of coverage previously included housing (2 years) and pollution control (1 year).

Summer 1977 Research Assistant in Utilities.

1973-1976 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO. Colorado Springs, Colorado.

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1971-1973 CAMERON COLLEGE, Lawton, Oklahoma.

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1978 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, MBA -
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